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of Commons, the Upper House has almost ceased to use its right of veto.  This has imposed an effective limitation on its exercise of legislative power.

There are of course other important if informal methods by which Canada’s diversity is represented in the national organs of government.  We refer to the representation in federal cabinets of the several provinces of Canada, of both of the country’s basic linguistic groups, and of much of the diversity in religion and culture in the nation.  Similarly the major political parties in the House of Commons have organized so as to ensure in their caucuses and otherwise that these interests are adequately represented.

We believe, however, that the role and the powers of the Senate should be reviewed.  It might well be reconstituted so as to enable it to play a new role in representing the federal character of our country.  It might, for example, be called upon to make a special contribution in securing the rights of Canadians and in protecting the bilingual character of Canada.  It might also be expected to reflect better than it does now the regional interests of our country.

If the role and the powers of the Senate were to be changed, it would also be appropriate, in the judgement of the Government of Canada, to consider changes in the method of appointment.  For the method of selecting Senators clearly should be related to the particular role and functions of an Upper House in a federal form of government.

Our proposals for a controlled development of the Constitution do not envisage a discussion at this meeting of Senate reform.  But we did want to make known the Government’s view that the Senate can be made a more effective institution of federalism, and our willingness to discuss at subsequent conferences this aspect of Canada’s Constitution.

The Supreme Court.  Another essential clement of federalism is the system under which disputes as to the meaning or application of the Constitution are adjudicated.  There have been serious discussions in Canada concerning the composition, jurisdiction and procedures of our final constitutional court, the Supreme Court of Canada; these properly should be considered in any review of the Constitution.  For example, the Supreme Court both as a general court of appeal and the final court in constitutional matters now operates under an ordinary statute of the Parliament of Canada.  It has been urged that its Constitution and role should be set forth in the fundamental law.

The Government of Canada will be prepared to discuss questions such as these at the constitutional meetings to follow.  At this time, however, we would set forth the fundamental principles which in our view should guide us in such discussions.  First, there is a functional need, in a federal
 

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