tions of federalism. We say this because provincial interests and the interests of Canada’s two linguistic groups are not and cannot be represented simply through the device of transferring powers from the federal government to provincial governments. These interests are and must be reflected as well in constitutional guarantees and in the central institutions of federalism. It follows that a balanced judgement as to the powers required by the provincial governments for the primary purpose of protecting linguistic or provincial interests can only be made in the perspective of the constitutional guarantees and the representation of such interests in the central organs of government. To jeopardize the capacity of the federal government to act for Canada, in the name of protecting linguistic and provincial rights, when what is essential could be accomplished through constitutional guarantees and the institutions of federalism, would be to serve Canadians badly. Furthermore, the division of powers between orders of government should be guided by principles of functionalism, and not by ethnic considerations. Such principles can best be applied after issues concerning the protection of linguistic rights have been settled.
The Government of Canada would propose, therefore, that discussions on the division of powers take place at subsequent conferences. However, in anticipation of these discussions, and as a guide to the direction of the Government’s thinking we believe we should place before the Conference some of the principles by which we feel we would have to be guided.
First, we are committed to the view that Canada requires both a strong federal government and strong provincial governments. The field of government now is so wide, and the problems of government are so many, that it is not a contradiction to speak in these terms. Governments themselves confirm this view when they argue that their spending responsibilities exceed their ability to raise revenues. There is another reason for achieving a balance between the powers of the federal and provincial governments: the freedom of the individual is more likely to be safeguarded if neither order of government is able to acquire a preponderant power over the citizen.
Secondly, the Government of Canada believes that there are certain areas of responsibility which must remain with the federal government if our country is to prosper in the modern world. The Parliament of Canada must have responsibility for the major and inextricably inter-related instruments of economic policy if it is to stimulate employment and control inflation. It must have control over monetary and credit policy, the balance-wheel role in fiscal policy, tariff policy, and balance of payments policy. It must be responsible for interprovincial and international trade. It must be able to undertake measures for stimulating the growth of the economy, some of which inevitably and some of which intentionally will affect
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“Furthermore, the division of powers between orders of government should be guided by principles of functionalism, and not by ethnic considerations.” Pearson is already planning to destroy the ethnic self-government of the local Legislatures and the founding peoples. He’s making a power grab for ethnic control which was explicitly relegated to the Provinces in 1867 to eliminate undue outside interference in local culture.
“To jeopardize the capacity of the federal government to act for Canada, in the name of protecting linguistic and provincial rights, when what is essential could be accomplished through constitutional guarantees and the institutions of federalism, would be to serve Canadians badly”. Extremely duplicitous! His real goal is to centralize at least a part of the normally local ethnic control over the institutions of self-government of the founding majorities. In pulling ethnic controls out of the provinces, and into the federal arena, he seems to be preparing for the mass immigration, and perhaps we see this in the unlawful (void) post-coup statute by Mulroney, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. In 1976-79, the CBA “coup committee” on the constitution will recommend adding “explicit authorization” to the “new” constitution for governments to “assist” imported foreigners with their own cultures and languages; and to add “multiculturalism” to the Preamble. Neither of these things was done; nevertheless, I seem to see here Pearson’s intent to facilitate the intended multiculturalism from the federal-level powers that justly belong to the Provinces for their own self-preservation. In this way, pending the final dismantling into multicultural city-states, the real “new federalism”, with ethnic enclaves modeled on the current Provinces (with local ethnic powers and institutions), Pearson is able to rob the Provinces in order to centralize the development of the “new” Canada, his real “federalism for the future”. In the end, it has been done ad hoc, as nothing has been added to the 1982 coup constitution to aid the cause in “legal” terms; which would be superficial, in any event.