undertaken by those who represent the people and who head our governments. This does not mean — it cannot mean — that the Prime Minister of Canada and the first ministers of the provinces must undertake the whole task. But it does, we think, mean that the discussions must be conducted and controlled by governments at all stages, and that the decisions as to the changes to be initiated in institutions or in political relationships must be taken by governments in a way that will enjoy the support of their legislative bodies.
In the light of these considerations, it is the view of the Government of Canada that a comprehensive review must involve the willingness of the heads of government to meet in Federal-Provincial Conferences at relatively frequent intervals over the next two or three years to guide and control the process of review. This may seem an arduous schedule, but we must remember that it took two to three years to write the original Constitution. Such a continuing Constitutional Conference, of which this would be the first meeting, would undoubtedly from time to time establish special committees to undertake the study of particular questions: these might be committees of Ministers or of officials as seemed best. The Conference might also wish to establish a Continuing Committee of officials, responsible to it, to facilitate discussions by examining in a preliminary way policy questions referred to them by the Prime Minister and Premiers, to co-ordinate research and the preparation of material for the Conference, and in other ways to facilitate the ministerial discussions.
Undoubtedly each government would want to consider, too, the means by which it could receive the views of individuals, organizations and groups, and the advice of experts, as the process of review proceeded, so that these could contribute to the total consideration of the problems. Conclusions reached at the continuing Constitutional Conference would have to be referred back to the governments concerned for concurrence before they were implemented as constitutional amendments or as parts of a new constitution. These questions of method might vary depending on the matter in issue. In all cases, however, it would have to be a matter for each government to determine, as in the case of previous amendments, the precise method by which concurrence would be expressed. As for the Government of Canada, we propose to submit to Parliament for consideration and approval all changes in the Constitution to which we agree.
In addition to agreeing on the procedure for the constitutional review, it would be necessary to determine the most constructive sequence in which to deal with the Constitution. It is the view of the Government of Canada, as we have said, that it would be best to begin with the rights of individuals
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“Undoubtedly each government would want to consider, too, the means by which it could receive the views of individuals, organizations and groups, and the advice of experts, as the process of review proceeded, so that these could contribute to the total consideration of the problems.” This is precisely how the Joint Committee operated (House and Senate) in the run-up to the 1982 coup d’état (for which this Pearson paper is a layer of groundwork.) Strayer, however, impliedly admits the question of whether this mode of consultation with lobbyists, interest groups and experts, essentially hand-picked by those running the show up top, is anywhere near “democratic”. So the principle of ‘democratism”, the mere appearance of democracy, or at least lip-service to a pretense of its existence, is laid down here in February 1968 as policy, while planning to keep the changes to Canada out of the hands of the Canadians who have political ownership of the country.
“[O]r as parts of a new constitution” Evidence of intent to commit high treason. And again, it’s the old “option” strategy.
Finally, we have here at pages 44 and 46, the quotation from Lorraine Weinrib’s review, taken by her from Bayefsky’s collection on the 1982 coup:
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“The second consideration is that the statement of the law, fundamental as it is, expresses in words the framework we want for political relationships within the Canadian community: the relationship of individuals to their governments and, since ours is a federation, the relationship of the different orders of government to one another. The adjustment of these relationships, within an established system of government — which we are seeking to improve rather than to establish on a wholly new basis — is one that must be undertaken by those who represent the people and who head our governments. This does not mean — it cannot mean — that the Prime Minister of Canada and the first ministers of the provinces must undertake the whole task. But it does, we think, mean that the discussions must be
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conducted and controlled by governments at all stages, and that the decisions as to the changes to be initiated in institutions or in political relationships must be taken by governments in a way that will enjoy the support of their legislative bodies.”