provincial interest. We have to consider seriously whether there should be a way for the federal government to seek to influence the provinces in cases where a national interest is involved, and a way for provincial governments to seek to influence the federal government when a provincial interest is involved.<\/p>\n
There are, we think, no easy solutions. What is required is a comprehensive review of the federal-provincial conferences and committees which now exist, how they function, and how their work is co-ordinated. We must be prepared, it seems to the Government of Canada, to give more systematic recognition to these new forms of federalism.<\/p>\n
We must be prepared to consider new methods for bringing provincial influence to bear on developing federal policies, and federal influence on developing provincial policies, before decisions have finally been taken. We must be prepared for innovations in the machinery of government which will enable us to preserve the essence of Canada’s two great governmental traditions — federalism and parliamentary government.<\/p>\n
Procedure for the Review of the Constitution<\/strong><\/p>\n If it is the decision of the Conference that Canada should embark upon a comprehensive re-assessment of the Constitution, it is most important to consider the manner and the sequence in which this can best be done. In doing so, two considerations must be carefully weighed.<\/p>\n First, any arrangements must be adequate to the gravity of the task being undertaken. The constitution is the basic framework within which the life of the country is ordered and regulated. If we change or adjust it without careful thought for the consequences, we can create serious injury to the whole scheme of relations that is central to the functioning of our government and laws. We are today aware of defects: we must not let them blind us to the existence of virtues, nor must we let them cause us to believe that any change will be an improvement. If a mistake is made in an ordinary statute, it can be remedied at a subsequent session of Parliament or the legislature. But a constitutional error may be almost irremediable and the consequences serious in the extreme. The fundamental law is indeed fundamental, and its examination and review must be so treated.<\/p>\n The second consideration is that the statement of the law, fundamental as it is, expresses in words the framework we want for political relationships within the Canadian community: the relationship of individuals to their governments and, since ours is a federation, the relationship of the different orders of government to one another. The adjustment of these relationships, within an established system of government — which we are seeking to improve rather than to establish on a wholly new basis — is one that must be provincial interest. We have to consider seriously whether there should be a way for the federal government to seek to influence the provinces in cases where a national interest is involved, and a way for provincial governments to seek to influence the federal government when a provincial interest is involved. There are, we think, no…<\/p>\n
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\n44<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"